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WHOSE NATURAL LAW?*
WILLIAM J. KENEALY, S.J.**
P ROFESSOR GEORGE W. GOBLE of the Law Faculty of the University
of Illinois has written a challenging and significant article, entitled
"NATURE, MAN AND LAW: THE TRUE NATURAL LAW," in
the American Bar Association Journal of May, 1955. (Vol. 41, No. 5,
p. 403). Professor Goble's article is refreshingly free from the acerbities
which too often detract from the substance of controversial articles pro
and con the natural law. The article manifests the kindness and humility
of sincere scholarship. It follows a standard of calm and dispassionate
controversy which might well assist both proponents and opponents of
the classical natural law, if not to resolve their differences, at least to
discover them. Such a mutual discovery, in the opinion of this reviewer,
would be a major contribution to the most ancient controversy of the law.
Professor Goble's article is significant because it illustrates the fact
that the status quaestionis of the old controversy is badly out of joint. It
brings into focus the fact that contemporary proponents and opponents of
the classical natural law frequently argue about "two different things."
The issue is not joined. Professor Goble sets up and rejects a concept
of natural law which would also be repudiated by every classicist from
Thomas Aquinas to Heinrich Rommen. By "classicists" I mean the
scholars and spokesmen of the traditional natural law philosophy as
expounded by the medieval scholastics and the modern neo-scholastics.
The concept rejected by Professor Goble differs essentially from the
classical concept in two fundamental and all-pervasive aspects: the very
meaning of the natural law, and its epistemological basis. Obviously the
issue cannot be joined and the merits cannot be argued on the basis of
such fundamental misunderstanding.
*Reprinted from I CATHOLIC LAWYER 259 (October, 1955).
** A.B.; A.M.; Ph.D.; S.T.L.; LL.B. Member of the Bar of the District of Colum-
bia and of the State of Massachusetts. Admitted to practice in the Supreme Court
of the United States, and the Court of Military Appeals. Served as a Lieut. Com-
mander in the United States Navy aboard the U.S.S. California during World
War II.
WHOSE NATURAL LAW?
In discussing the meaning of the classical
or traditional concept of natural law, I
trust that I will be forgiven for quoting an
official statement of the Law School of
which I am dean. I do so for two reasons:
first, I wrote it some years ago in an at-
tempt to set out a concise statement of the
classical concept; and secondly, it has ap-
peared annually for some years in the of-
ficial Bulletin of a Law School dedicated to
the traditional natural law philosophy. To
the best of my knowledge, it has not been
the target of a single shaft of disagreement
from the ready quivers of traditional nat-
ural law philosophers. The statement, with
italics as they appear in the original text,
is as follows:
"The purpose of the Boston College
Law School is to prepare young men and
women of intelligence, industry and char-
acter, for careers of public service in the
administration of justice; to equip them
for positions of leadership in advancing
the ideals of justice in our democratic so-
ciety. With this two-fold objective, students
are given a rigorous training in the prin-
ciples and rules, the standards and tech-
niques of the law, not as positivistic ends
in themselves, but as rational means, cap-
able of constant improvement, to the at-
tainment of objective justice in civil society.
"For the Boston College Law School is
dedicated to the philosophy that there is in
fact an objective moral order, to which
human beings and civil societies are bound
in conscience to conform, and upon which
the peace and happiness of personal, na-
tional and international life depend. The
mandatory aspect of the objective moral
order is called by philosophers the natural
law. In virtue of the natural law, funda-
mentally equal human beings are endowed
with certain natural rights and obligations
to enable them to attain, in human dignity,
the divine destiny decreed for them by their
Creator. These natural rights and obliga-
tions are inalienable precisely because they
are God-given. They are antecedent, both
in logic and in nature, to the formation of
civil societies. They are not granted by the
beneficence of the state; wherefore the
tyranny of a state cannot destroy them.
Rather it is the high moral responsibility
of civil society, through the instrumentality
of its civil laws, to acknowledge their exis-
tence and to protect their exercise, to foster
and facilitate their enjoyment by the wise
and scientific implementation of the natural
law with a practical and consonant code
of civil rights and obligations.
"The construction and maintenance of a
corpus juris adequately implementing the
natural law is a monumental and perpetual
task demanding the constant devotion of
the best brains and the most mature
scholarship of the legal profession. For the
fundamental principles of the natural law,
universal and immutable as the human
nature from which they derive, require
rational application to the constantly
changing political, economic and social
conditions of civil society. The application
of the natural law postulates change as
the circumstances of human, existence
change. It repudiates a naive and smug
complacency in the status quo. It demands
a reasoned acceptance of the good, and a
rejection of the bad, in all that is new.
It commands a critical search for the bet-
ter. It requires an exhaustive scrutiny of
all the available data of history, politics,
economics, sociology, psychology, philos-
ophy, and every other pertinent font of
human knowledge. Of primary importance,
it insists that the search for a better corpus
juris be made in the light of the origin, na-
ture, dignity and destiny of man; and in the
knowledge of the origin, nature, purpose
and limitations of the state.
"This is the traditional American philos-
ophy of law, the philosophy upon which
this nation was founded and to which this
nation, by its most solemn covenants and
usages, is dedicated. It is opposed today,
even by some within the legal profession,
by the philosophies of positivism, prag-
matism, realism and utilitarianism-all of
which have an ideological common de-
nominator in subjectivism-and none of
which can offer an intellectually adequate
reply to the destructive philosophy of
totalitarianism." Cf. Boston College Bul-
letin, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, April, 1955.
I believe that this capsule description of
natural law philosophy is in complete har-
mony, not only with the classical concept
of Maritain, Gilson, Rommen and the
modern neo-scholastics, but also with that
of Aquinas, Suarez, Vittoria and the
medieval scholastics. Hundreds of profes-
sors, teaching the classical concept in uni-
versities today, would undoubtedly write
a better description; but I am confident
that none would dispute the substance of
the statement quoted. If this is so, if the
statement fairly represents the meaning of
the classical natural law concept, with
particular reference to its notion of im-
mutability and universality, its distinction
between ends and means, its requirement
of change and improvement, and its search
for the good and the better, then I find it
difficult to escape the conclusion that Pro-
17 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1971
fessor Goble has not come to grips with
that concept. I think that he is chastising
the wrong horse.
Professor Goble seems to contemplate
the classical concept as meaning a com-
pletely closed system of principles and
rules, immutable and universal, incapable
of change and improvement, and therefore
a hindrance to the pursuit of truth and an
obstacle to the development of a better
system of justice. He states:
Holmes, unlike the natural law man, did
not believe that because he firmly held cer-
tain views, they were necessarily universal
or infallible truths, or that the acceptance of
them by others was essential to the preserva-
tion of civilization or the republic .... The
classical natural law on the other hand, by
definition, must forever remain unchanged.
While experience has required its devotees
to recede from this position from time to
time, by hypothesis the system is immutable.
No amount of experience or new light may
be used as the basis for altering it or revis-
ing it. It seems to me therefore, that the
Holmes' view makes possible the continuous
advance of the standards of human conduct,
whereas the natural law view, having in
theory already attained perfection, retards
it. (P. 474, emphasis supplied.)
I trust that the above quotations do not
distort Professor Goble's context. That con-
text misses the meaning of the classical
natural law of the scholastic tradition. In
fairness to Professor Goble, his context has
considerable relevance to the "natural law"
theories of Pufendorf, Thomasius, Hobbes,
Spinoza and their followers in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. This was
the era of the various "state of nature"
theories which fascinated the autonomous
rationalism of the times. The "state of na-
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ture" theories inspired an orgy of abstract
reasoning which gave birth to deductively
constructed systems purporting to regulate
and to crystallize all legal institutions down
to incredible details: prescribing the rules
affecting contracts, debts, the acquisition
and use of property, inheritance, the family,
constitutional and international law-and
even procedural laws in the alleged "states
of nature." Such theories were frequently
utilized for rather practical purposes:
sometimes to strengthen the contemporary
political, economic and social status quo
by dignifying it with the blessing of "nat-
ural law"; sometimes to undermine the
prevailing status quo by damning it with
the condemnation of "natural law." But
all such "state of nature" theories, with
their closed and crystallized legal systems,
were and are alien and hostile to the classi-
cal concept of natural law. Their authors
are the express adversaries of the scholastic
system. I need not point out that the the-
ological phrase status purae naturae has
only a verbal similarity to the philosoph-
ical "states of nature" of rationalism.
It is quite true, of course, that the classi-
cal natural law postulates some fundamen-
tal principles, which are considered im-
mediately self-evident principles of the
practical reason, as certain, universal and
immutable. But this is a far cry from a
closed legal system. The fundamental prin-
ciples of the natural law are generally di-
vided into a primary principle and its
immediate specifications, called secondary
principles. The primary principle is usually
phrased in such terms as "What is good is
to be done, and what is evil is to be
avoided," a principle which includes "What
is just is to be done, and what is unjust is
to be avoided." As immediate specifica-
tions of the primary principle, the sec-
ondary principles find familiar expression
in the (still general) terms of the Deca-
logue. The secondary principles share the
certainty, universality and immutability of
the primary principle. But when we ad-
vance from these fundamental principles,
we enter the field of derivative principles
and standards and applications of the nat-
ural law to concrete problems.
The derivatives do not share equally,
some do not share at all in the certainty,
universality and immutability of the funda-
mental principles. They do not bask in the
sunshine of immediate self-evidence. They
must be laboriously cultivated in the much
dimmer light, sometimes in the darker twi-
light of mediate evidence. In the field of
derivatives there is certainty, probability
and mere possibility; there is growth,
change and improvement. Incidentally,
even the truths called "self-evident" in the
Declaration of Independence are not self-
evident in the philosophical sense. They
are derivative principles of natural law.
They must be demonstrated by argument.
It is only the fundamental principles of
the natural law which are held to be self-
evident, and consequently certain, uni-
versal and immutable. From this position
devotees of classical natural law have not
receded "from time to time." It is a fair
question to ask: what fundamental princi-
ple, what principle held to be certain, uni-
versal and immutable has been relin-
quished at any time by devotees of the
classical natural law?
That natural law does not mean a closed
legal system, is evident from the fact that
the fundamental principles do not tell us
automatically in concrete applications what
is good or evil, just or unjust, wise or un-
wise; what is idolatry, murder, theft, adul-
tery, perjury or calumny. It is evident from
the fact that the natural law envisions an
enormous number of actions which are
indifferent in themselves, and which re-
ceive their morality (and suitable legality)
from the relative elements of time, place
and circumstance, and from the subjective
elements of intention and motive. It is evi-
dent from the fact that the natural law
concept requires the construction, mainte-
nance and improvement of a corpus juris
to meet the needs of a constantly changing
human society; and that it demands that
this perpetual task be performed by the
scholarly and practical use of the expand-
ing data of human knowledge and experi-
ence. This is utterly incompatible with Pro-
fessor Goble's idea of the "attained perfec-
tion" of the classical natural law concept.
The possession of a compass does not
make the navigator's job unnecessary.
Professor Goble objects to the tradi-
tional natural law concept because he be-
lieves it has been used to further objec-
tionable causes and to obstruct desirable
social and economic reforms. He states:
Exponents of classical natural law are
usually able to find or create natural law
principles which support what they want to
believe .... Before the Civil War both pro-
slavery and anti-slavery advocates invoked
natural law as the basis for their views....
During the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries the opposition to legislation pro-
hibiting child labor, reducing working hours
for women, and improving working condi-
tions in hazardous industries, was based
partly upon the principle that by natural
law, freedom of contract could not be in-
terfered with legislation. (P. 473.)
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The first quoted sentence pinpoints an
unfortunate psychological weakness which
afflicts all men when they are blinded by
emotions, prejudices and the smoke of self-
ish interests. Natural law exponents can
claim no immunity from the weakness
which, I dare say, sometimes leads posi-
tivists, pragmatists, realists and utilitarians
"to find or create" respective principles
"which support what they want to be-
lieve." All of us need to overcome this
weakness by an intensification of scholarly
criticism and dispassionate controversy.
The chief examples cited by Professor
Goble are, to say the least, weak indict-
ments of the classical natural law. The
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
spanned the era of laissez-faire rugged in-
dividualism, which stemmed from the phi-
losophies of Rousseau, Kant, Austin and
the Manchester School of Economics. It
is true that the Supreme Court of the era
utilized the terminology of "natural law"
to deify an abstract concept of liberty of
contract for the protection of vested prop-
erty interests to the detriment of human
rights. But the philosophers mentioned
above, and the proponents of laissez-faire
rugged individualism are again the express
adversaries of the classical natural law
philosophy. Again, it is fair to ask what
representative natural law philosopher or
spokesman held the principle that "by nat-
ural law, freedom of contract could not be
interfered with by legislation"? A philoso-
phy is one thing, its terminology is another;
but its terminology in the mouths of its
express adversaries is a great source of con-
fusion, misunderstanding and embarrass-
ment. Economic Liberalism itself recog-
nized the classical natural law philosophy
as its prime adversary.
WHOSE NATURAL LAW?
Professor Goble's criticism of classical
natural law, on the basis of its alleged "at-
tained perfection" and immutability, seems
analogous to the criticism of those who
reject natural law philosophy because it de-
fends absolute natural rights. Natural law
does indeed imply the existence of some
human rights which are absolute and in-
alienable, such as the right to life, worship,
marriage, property, labor, speech, locomo-
tion, assembly, reputation, etc. These are
absolute in the sense that they derive from
human nature; they are not mere hand-outs
from the state; the state is bound to protect
them and cannot destroy them even though,
by physical force, the state has sometimes
prevented their exercise. They are not ab-
solute in the sense that they are unlimited
in scope. It is a commonplace in classical
natural law philosophy that human rights,
even the most fundamental mentioned
above, are limited. They are limited in the
sense that they are subject to specification,
qualification, expansion and contraction,
and even forfeiture of exercise, as the equal
rights of others and the demands of the
common good from circumstance to cir-
cumstance, and from time to time, rea-
sonably indicate. Human rights are abso-
lute only in the sense of the minimal
requirements of a just and ordered liberty.
But this is not the stuff of a closed system
of immutably "attained perfection." This is
the stuff which requires the constant study,
scholarship, experience and experimenta-
tion implied in the quotation I have made
from the Boston College Law School Bul-
letin. For the above reasons I believe Pro-
fessor Goble has misunderstood the mean-
ing of the classical natural law philosophy.
Of equal significance, I believe, is Pro-
fessor Goble's misunderstanding of the
epistemological basis of natural law. This
basis answers to the question of why nat-
ural law men hold what they hold. Profes-
sor Goble says:
Since reason is fallible, the principal
problem posed by this view of natural law
[quoted, by the way, from Dean Pound] is
how or by whose reasoning is this infallible
law to be determined. When two or more
men or groups of men of equal sincerity
believe themselves to be endowed by the
Creator with the power to ascertain and
enunciate it, and they are in disagreement,
by what criterion is the choice to be made
between them? . . . History furnishes so
many examples of fighting faiths later re-
jected as unconscionable that it is difficult
for one to believe that sincerity or certitude
is a reliable test of truth. (P. 407. Emphasis
supplied.)
Witness the comparatively recent con-
demnation of millions of innocent people to
death in gas chambers, to imprisonment in
slave labor camps and to banishment in the
salt mines because of the certitude of their
condemners as to their own racial superior-
ity or the infallibility of their political sys-
tems. . . . Before the Civil War both
pro-slavery and anti-slavery advocates in-
voked natural law as the basis for their
views. (P. 473.)
Mr. Justice Holmes has been one of the
great critics of the classical natural law
theory. He said, "The jurists who believe in
natural law seem to me to be in that naive
state of mind, that accepts what has been
familiar, and accepted by them and their
neighbors, as something that must be ac-
cepted by all men everywhere." Holmes be-
lieved that "Certitude is not the test of
certainty," and that "we have been cock-
sure of many things that were not so."
(PP. 473-474. Emphasis supplied.)
I have supplied the italics in the above
quotations. From these quotations and their
context, and I trust they do not distort the
context, I infer that Professor Goble be-
lieves that the epistemological basis of nat-
ural law philosophy is: the criterion of
truth is subjective certitude or sincerity of
subjective conviction. This is simply not
true. It is diametrically opposed to the epis-
temology of classical natural law. It is fair
to ask for the name of one responsible
natural law spokesman who makes subjec-
tive conviction the criterion of truth. On the
contrary, natural law philosophers unani-
mously set up objective evidence as the
criterion of truth. The philosophers of vari-
ous theories of subjectivism, Descartes,
Spinoza, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume, and
their followers are again the express episte-
mological adversaries of classical natural
law.
The natural law is founded upon the
existence of an objective moral order and
the knowability of objective truth. Quite
consistently, and necessarily, it makes ob-
jective evidence the criterion of that truth.
To argue for or against natural law, or any
one of its principles, or any application of
its principles, on the basis of mere subjec-
tive certitude or sincerity of conviction,
would be as irrelevant and immaterial as
any similar argument in any intellectual
field-philosophical, scientific or legal.
Subjectivism is sheer intellectual defeatism.
According to Professor Goble "the prin-
cipal problem posed" by the natural law,
when "two or more men or groups of men
of equal sincerity" are in disagreement, is
this: "by what criterion is the choice to be
made between them?" The natural law phi-
losopher answers: objective evidence. And
to the question as to who shall make the
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choice, the answer is: whoever undertakes
to evaluate the objective evidence. This is
the epistemological basis for the civil law
rules of evidence. This is the standard un-
derlying our legal trials. This is the stan-
dard applied by our supreme courts in the
difficult due process cases, which touch
natural law principles most closely. To
abandon objective evidence for a subjective
standard would be to open the flood-gates
of arbitrariness and capriciousness. Subjec-
tivism is simply incompatible with natural
law philosophy.
In criticising natural law, Professor
Goble cites Holmes to the effect that
"Certitude is not the test of certainty" and
that "we have been cock-sure of many
things that were not so." With this observa-
tion of Holmes, I agree. My agreement
rests upon the objective evidence of my
own personal errors and the objective evi-
dence of the history of human thought.
Furthermore, my agreement extends to the
epistemological principle which seems to
be implicit in the words of Holmes:
namely, that there is a rational basis for
making a distinction between "certitude"
and "certainty"; that there is an intellectual
difference between error and truth; and that
at least some cock-sure errors of the past
have been overhauled by the relentless pur-
suit of objective truth. To me this means
that there are in fact some objective truths
known with certainty on the basis of ob-
jective evidence. And if there are some so
known, what limits shall we put to the
critical and dispassionate pursuit of others?
But this is the epistemology of classical
natural law.
Professor Goble places great emphasis
upon errors of the past, and upon the con-
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tradictions and disagreements of the past
and present-particularly those concerning
political, economic, social and legal prob-
lems. As an argument specifically against
natural law, this proves altogether too
much. Its probative value, if any, militates
against any and all philosophies. Positivists,
pragmatists, realists and utilitarians differ
considerably as to what in the concrete is
positivistic, pragmatic, realistic and useful.
But such differences surely do not con-
stitute the intellectual basis for rejecting the
philosophies of positivism, pragmatism,
realism or utilitarianism. Natural law phi-
losophers agree on the fundamental prin-
ciples of the natural law; they differ on its
derivative principles and standards; and
there is wide divergence of opinion as to
the concrete applications of its derivative
principles and standards to the constantly
changing political, economic, social and
legal conditions of human society. But what
do such differences of opinion prove?
Surely not the invalidity of the fundamental
philosophy. Such differences demonstrate
that the area of opinion is larger than the
area of certainty. Such differences prove
the finiteness of the human mind and the
enormous complexity of the human prob-
lems which we must constantly strive to
solve as best we can. Our differences
should indeed humble us and make us
more tolerant of the opinions of others;
but they should not defeat us or discourage
the relentless pursuit of objective truth.
Because they do not prove the incapacity
of the human mind to know with certainty
(i.e., without prudent fear of error) some
objective truths on the basis of objective
evidence. As a matter of fact, "when two
or more men or groups of men of equal
sincerity" differ, they may both be wrong;
but the significant thing is that their very
differing is predicated upon the assumption
that there is some objective truth to differ
about, and that the pursuit of objective
truth is worth-while. Error is simply un-
intelligible without the existence of objec-
tive truth attainable by human reason.
It is obvious, I trust, that this commen-
tary on Professor Goble's article is in no
sense an attempt to prove the validity of
natural law or the soundness of its episte-
mology. It is simply an attempt to show
that Professor Goble has misunderstood the
meaning and the epistemology of the classi-
cal natural law philosophy. It is my per-
sonal opinion that there are three factors
which have induced such a misunderstand-
ing on the part of Professor Goble and
many others in the legal profession. They
are: first, the misuse of natural law ter-
minology, in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, in support of laissez-
faire rugged individualism; second, the al-
most complete unfamiliarity of most mem-
bers of the profession with the writings of
the great natural law philosophers, and a
consequent reliance upon secondary (and
sometimes unscholarly) sources of infor-
mation; and third, an unfortunate propen-
sity, on the part of some natural law
enthusiasts, to claim too much for their
philosophy.
Concerning the first factor: many United
States Supreme Court opinions of the last
century, indicated by Professor Goble,
which exalted property and contractual
rights to the detriment of other basic human
rights and the genuine needs of the com-
mon good, are excellent examples. Regard-
ing the second: the writings of Holmes and
the article by Professor Goble are, I be-
lieve, clear instances. As to the third: I
have reference to the naive mentality
which would say "all we have to do to
solve our problems is to apply the natural
law." This mentality has its counterpart,
of course, in that which would say "all we
have to do to solve our problems is to be
realistic" or "pragmatic." It is quite like
the simplicist attitude of the naive citizen
who would say "all we have to do to solve
our problems is to apply the Constitution."
The fact is that the classical natural law
philosophy teaches, as one of its prime
tenets, that the natural law and its funda-
mental principles are inadequate to solve
the complex problems of human society.
The natural law demands implementation
by civil law; and such implementation fre-
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quently involves, not merely research and
argumentation, certitude and probability,
but also trial and error experimentation.
But this is not the natural law dismissed
by Professor Goble.
Wherefore I have entitled this commen-
tary "WHOSE NATURAL LAW?" Whose
natural law does Professor Goble dismiss?
Not mine. Not that of the Boston College
Law School. Not that of the medieval scho-
lastics. Not that of the modern neo-scho-
lastics. Not that of the classical tradition.
Whose? I confess that I look forward to the
opportunity to sit down informally with
Professor Goble some day to discuss, and
if possible to clarify, for our mutual satis-
faction, the status quaestionis of the oldest
controversy of the law.
